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Abstract. In this paper, we present a formal model-driven engineering
approach to establishing a safety-assured implementation of Multifunc-
tion vehicle bus controller (MVBC) based on the generic reference models
and requirements described in the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) standard IEC-61375. First, the generic models described
in IEC-61375 are translated into a network of timed automata, and some
safety requirements tested in IEC-61375 are formalized as timed compu-
tation tree logic (TCTL) formulas. With the help of Uppaal, we check
and debug whether the timed automata satisfy the formulas or not.
Within this step, several logic inconsistencies in the original standard
are detected and corrected. Then, we apply the tool Times to generate
C code from the verified model, which was later synthesized into a real
MVBC chip. Finally, the runtime verification tool RMOR is applied to
verify some safety requirements at the implementation level. We set up
a real platform with worldwide mostly used MVBC D113, and verify
the correctness and the scalability of the synthesized MVBC chip more
comprehensively. The errors in the standard has been confirmed and the
resulted MVBC has been deployed in real train communication network.
1 Introduction
The train communication network (TCN) enabling secure and fast data trans-
mission in the entire rail vehicle has been standardized by the international
railroad union and the International Electrical Commission, as presented in the
international standard IEC-61375 [3]. Within the network, the multifunction
vehicle bus controller (MVBC) is defined as a typical embedded software used
mostly for the control of data transmission among the equipment (the traction
control unit, air brake electronic control unit and door control unit etc.) on-
board of each individual vehicle. Detail functions of the MVBC are based on the
real-time protocol (RTP), which defines the rules (master-slave communication
principle, data frame format and timing requirements, etc.) for process data and
message data transmission.
Traditionally, from the perspective of industrial practice, most companies
such as Siemens and Duagon develop their MVBCs by directly writing under-
lying C and VHDL code manually according to the description of IEC-61375,
accompanied with the complex system and physical testing to avoid defects.
Increasingly developed modern railroad vehicles increased the functional com-
plexity, and are more difficult to ensure the correctness through testing. For
2example, even the most widely used D113 MVBC of Duagon company contains
some dead logic in the C code for process data communication. From the per-
spective of academia, there are many existing works for the design of MVBC,
but mainly focusing on the novel implementation hardware architecture [5]. In
[5], they propose to use materialization of slave nodes for MVBC in a single
chip by using reconfigurable logic. In [11], they propose to use BeagleBone and
some existing tools such as Simulink to implement the MVBC, which is starting
from model construction and ending in programming according to the validated
model. Most of them focus on the functional implementation and do not pay at-
tention on safety assurance under dynamic physical environment. Besides, there
are also some works about verifying the real time communication protocol of
TCN [6], they do not cope with the implementation issue neither, they focus
on the logic correctness of train communication protocol only. Little research
has been conducted to address the safety issue of MVBC, and some failures of
the communication function have been reported to result in the accidents of the
railway and trains [12], and some cases with serious injuries of human.
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Fig. 1. Safety-assured design of MVBC. We may also replace these tools with similar
functional tools such as SPIN and RV-Monitor. If we use SPIN to replace Uppaal, we
need to build the SPIN Promela model instead of Uppaal timed automata model.
In this paper, we collaborate with the researchers from China Railway Rolling
Stock Corporation (CRRC), and use formal model-driven development approach
to establishing a safety-assured implementation of an MVBC prototype based
on the standard IEC-61375, which consists of two parts: IEC-61375-1 describing
the architecture and functional behaviors of MVBC, and IEC-61375-2 describing
the conformance testing requirements. The overall procedure is presented in
Fig. 1, where we leverage the formal modeling and verification technique as
follows 1) the generic models and requirements in the standard are formalized as
Uppaal timed automata and TCTL expressions [2] respectively, 2) formally verify
the requirements and debug the models with Uppaal until the timed automata
satisfies the TCTL expressions, 3) generate C code from the verified model with
Times [1], which can be compiled and synthesized into a real MVBC chip with
some auxiliary code developed to interface with hardware, and 4) use runtime
verification to formally verify some implementation level safety requirements
3and test the consistency between the execution of the integrated system and the
simulation of the verified model with RMOR [4]. Then, we set up a real platform,
connecting the synthesized MVBC prototype for safety assured communication
demonstration. During the practice, the errors detected in the standard has
been confirmed and the synthesized prototype has been in productization and
deployed in real train system control.
2 Safety-Assured Approach
Model construction and verification: First, we build a network of timed
automata for the MVBC according to the architecture and functional descrip-
tion, such as the generic automata model, the function and action table, and
the SDL(Specification and Description Language) diagram of IEC-611375-1. All
these heterogeneous information are unified translated and encoded into the
network of timed automata manually. Currently, it is not easy to automatically
abstract the timed automata model from the text-based standard, and the whole
construction procedure is manually accomplished and validated with the help of
engineers from CRRC with the following modeling guidance rules.
Let us see the translation of generic automata and the accompanied function
table. Each state in the generic automata is mapped to an ordinary location in
Uppaal with the same name. For the packets of sending and receiving events with
actual parameters specified for the control fields, we use the synchronous channel
of Uppaal timed automata to simulate the communication. Because there are lots
of none interrupt actions and packets associated with a single generic state while
only one synchronous action is allowed to be attached in a single transition of
Uppaal timed automata, we need to create a set of committed locations, where
none interrupt actions are sequentially encoded into the transitions among those
committed locations. Then, the attached actions described in the function table
of the standard, they are translated into the accompanied actions of the Uppaal
timed automata transition.
For the translation of SDL diagram, each state in the diagram is mapped to
an ordinary location of Uppaal. Some plain C codes in the diagram are translated
into the action attached on the transition of two locations. The event signal of
SDL diagram is modeled by the synchronous channel of timed automata, where
receiving an event is denoted as Rcv Channel Name? and sending an event
is denoted as Send Channel Name!. In case of situations with more than two
signals between two states, we need to add some intermediate locations of timed
automata. Note that, for the clock signal, it is issued by itself. Hence, we do not
need to translate it into a synchronous channel.
Safety Requirements Formalization: The MVBC safety requirements are
mainly derived from the descriptions of the MVBC conformance testing require-
ment of IEC-61375-2. We divide the testing requirement into two groups: model
verifiable safety requirement and implementation verifiable safety requirement.
Those requirements that are related to general functions of control logic and
independent of platform are categorized as model verifiable safety requirements.
We formalize them as timed computation tree logic formulas defined on the for-
mal timed automata, and verify them in Uppaal. For example, the requirement
that there is at most one regular master MVBC contained in the train commu-
nication network, is a typical model verifiable safety requirements, and can be for-
malized as A[ ]not(MVBC(1).Regular Master &&MVBC(2).Regular Master).
Those requirements related with dynamic runtime situation and uncertain
environment are categorized as implementation verifiable safety requirements.
4They are not easy to be defined in the abstract timed automata level, because
it is not easy to model dynamic transmission delay of data on MVBC bus and
dynamic processing delay of hardware platform, even with a preliminary chan-
nel model and clock variable in Uppaal timed automata. We formalize these
safety requirements as the runtime verification property of RMOR. We define
some events based on the variables of the generated C code of Times, which are
configured to I/O pins of the real hardware platform and will be continuously
loaded by accompanied C functions. Then, the property and the accompanied
C functions are transformed and input to RMOR to get the instrumented code,
which can be made as an integral part of the target generated system, verify-
ing and guiding its execution within the dynamic environment. For example,
the requirement that he suggested time constraint on a master MVBC between
the finish of a master frame sending and the start of a response slave frame
receiving should be less than 42.7us is a typical implementation verifiable safety
requirements, and can be formalized as below:
DataCenter Monitor TimeConstraints ( ){ . . . . . .
event TimeoutResponse =
( ( T Master Send − T Slav Rece ive )<42.7)
event Tr igger = TimeoutResponse ;
s t a t e s a f e {When Tr igger −> e r r o r ;}
}
Listing 1.1. Runtime Property Definition for the Time Interval.
Code synthesis and verifier integration: For the code synthesis, automat-
ical code generation tools such as Times can be applied to reduce the hard work
efforts of manual implementation, which is also more human error prone. For
example, the engineers from the industrial sources (the Duagon company, the
China CR corporation) report that their MVBC is developed by directly writing
underlying C or VHDL code manually, where there are still some bugs such as
dead logic or dead code. Besides, the automatical code generation also facilitate
the traceability between the model and implementation, which results in better
documentations and easier maintains.
Before applying the code generation algorithm, we need to do some changes
on the formal model. More specifically, we construct and initialize the timed
automata template for two or more MVBCs for comprehensive verification, and
now need to isolate the timed automata of a single MVBC for code synthesis.
One way for isolation is to build a general environment model, which is ready
to receive any output synchronization action from the isolated MVBC and send
input synchronization action to the isolated MVBC. Then, we can generate exe-
cution code for both MVBC and the general environment, and manually separate
the generated code. Another way for isolation is to do some reverse engineer-
ing, where the synchronization channels denoting the packets of sending and
receiving events are reversed to the general variable. For example, a synchro-
nization channel rcv connect req? can be replaced by a declaration of boolean
variable rcv connect req. Meanwhile, an evaluation expression rcv connect req
== true should be added to the guard segment, and an assignment expression
rcv connect req := true should be added to the action segment. We use the
second way, because it can be automatically accomplished by parsing and up-
dating the XML file of the timed automata model, and the second isolation way
is more closed to the real operation scenario where the sending and receiving
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code is tightly coupled, the manually separation is more error prone.
After that, we also need to add some glue code, which is mainly used for
two functionalities, the interface between the software and hardware platform,
and timing implementation of the generated code on the hardware platform. For
interface, we just need to initialize some configure mapping files, mapping the
variable of software to the GPIO of the hardware platform. Accompanied type
conversion functions may be needed. For clocks, let sc be a global system clock.
For each clock x in the timed automata, let xreset be an integer variable holding
the system time of the last clock reset. The value of the clock is then (sc−xreset),
and a reset can be performed as xreset := sc.
Finally, based on the generated code and the handwriting glue code, we input
the formalized implementation verifiable safety requirement and the integrated
code to RMOR to generate the runtime verifier, and the system integration
is instrumented with the verifier for the runtime verification. The integrated
verifier keeps verifying the safety requirements on the running executable system.
To improve the safety confidence, we can also formalize some model verifiable
requirement into verifier, but will increasin the storage overhead of the system.
3 Experiment Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we apply it to the de-
sign of MVBC and compare it with BeagleBone [11], which is the most recently
available design framework for MVBC based on Simulink. More specifically, we
formalize 92 critical model verifiable safety requirements and 29 critical imple-
mentation verifiable safety requirements. During the verification process of the
proposed approach, 11 requirement violates in the model or the implementation
level. After discussion with the engineers from CRRC, 5 requirements are vio-
lated because of the error brought by our modeling behavior, and 6 requirements
are violated because of the error of the control logic described in the standard.
While in the verification process of BeagleBone, only one violation is detected
due to the limited specification and verification of Simulink Design Verifier. For
the second type of violation, we need to revise the timed automata model as
well as the back end IEC standard according to analysis results of counter ex-
amples. Besides, these violations are consistent to existing works [9, 10, 7, 8] and
have already been confirmed and would be revised in the new version of IEC
standard 61375. After revision, both the model level verification and the runtime
verification reports no violation.
Table 1. Resource utilization C compilation for MVBC, and the verification efficiency.
C Compilation Safety-Assured BeagleBone
Binary File Size KB 302 683
Bug in IEC Standard Detected 6(verification) 1(Simulink Design Verifier)
Injected Division by Zero Detected 10/10(verification) 4/10(Simulink Design Verifier)
Then, the generated code according to the revised model and the integrated
executable system with the eCos (Embedded Configurable Operation System)
is synthesized. Then, the synthesized binary files for the integrated C code can
be loaded and run on ARM7-STM32F407IGH6 processor. The binary file is 302
kb and 683 kb for the code generated by Times and BeagleBone respectively.
The difference is mainly derived from the fact that BeagleBone use Simulink C
code generator to generate many extra configuration files and introduces many
6libraries for scalability. To test the reliability of the system as well as some re-
quirements that can not be formalized, we connect the widely-used industrial
product MVBC card D113 with our synthesized MVBC for real-time communi-
cation. We use the application running on the industrial computer to monitor
communication, and read the message data from memory. It shows that the
communications confirm to the requirements defined in the part two of standard
IEC 61375.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a formal model-driven engineering approach to es-
tablishing a safety-assured implementation of MVBC based on the generic ref-
erence models and requirements described in the International Electrotechni-
cal Commission (IEC) standard 61375. The design part mainly includes for-
mal model construction, code generation and integration, and the safety-assured
part mainly includes model level verification and implementation level verifica-
tion. During the engineering practice, several logic inconsistencies in the original
standard are detected and corrected.
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